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Corporates profits are routinely diverted from developing countries (relatively high-tax) to more 
advanced economies (comparatively low-tax), typically through conduit jurisdictions (nil tax). As 
pointed out in a two-part report to the G20 Development Working Group, this occurs through 
contractually reallocating risks, and the associated profits, to low taxed affiliates in offshore 
jurisdictions (supply chain restructuring); it occurs through excessive payments to foreign affiliates in 
respect of interests, royalties, management and technical fees, and other service charges (base-
eroding payments); it occurs through the indirect sale by offshore holding companies of interests in 
production facilities situated in developing countries (indirect sale of assets);  it occurs through the 
manipulation of transfer prices in respect of traded outputs and inputs (abusive transfer pricing); and 
by means of routing investment to developing countries through jurisdictions that have 
advantageous tax treaties with the host state (treaty shopping).1 These are just some of the most 
egregious techniques through which multinational enterprises (MNEs) shift profits to low-taxed 
entities in high-income countries. These techniques leverage debt, location of intangible assets, and 
transfer prices. They typically involve highly artificial and contrived arrangements whose main 
objective is to reduce the overall tax liability of the corporate group – what is sometimes termed 
‘aggressive’ or ‘abusive tax avoidance’.  
Profit shifting is a main obstacle to achieving sustainable and equitable development. The OECD 
conservatively estimates that as much as US$240 billion every year ─ or around 10 percent of global 
corporate income tax revenue ─ is lost in tax revenue as a result of corporate tax avoidance. 2  This is 
in line with IMF data, pointing to an estimated US$200 billion of revenue loss via tax-motivated base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) for non-OECD countries, corresponding to 1.3 percent of GDP.3 
The poorer countries have the most to lose, since corporate income tax constitutes a large 
proportion of their total revenue. 
We have extensively discussed elsewhere whether these profit shifting practices are legal or illegal 
and we do not want to duplicate that discussion.4 The focus of this backgrounder is on the regulatory 
enablers or drivers of profit shifting: rules and practices that make profit shifting possible, or even 
incentivise it. While institutional attention is mainly turned to the manifold technical regulatory 
loopholes and mismatches that MNEs exploit to avoid taxation, it is important to bear in mind that 
the problem is structural and systemic. As pointed out by some commentators,5 the enablers of 
profit shifting stand at the root of the international tax regime; they call into question the basic tenets 
of that regime. It is important to shed light on these structural enablers, before turning to specific 
technical loopholes. 
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Key structural enablers  
We can identify a few structural enablers of profit shifting, variously entangled: the independent 
entity principle and the related arm’s length principle, the mobility of residence and passive income, 
and fragmentation.  
Figure 1: Regulatory enablers of base erosion and profit shifting 
 
a) The independent entity principle 
Pursuant to the independent entity principle, the constituent entities of a MNE are treated as 
separate legal persons dealing at arm’s length (see below), if separately incorporated. This legal fiction 
holds even if a subsidiary company is 100 percent owned by its parent. It is a key structural enabler 
of profit shifting, which would otherwise been blocked: if MNEs were to be taxed as unitary firms, 
looking at the whole entity, there would be no point in artificially shifting profits to sub-units in low-
tax jurisdictions.  
b) The (related) arm’s length principle 
The problem is compounded by complex arm’s length rules that have proved particularly difficult to 
enforce. Under the arm’s length principle, prices set between related parties – parent and subsidiary, 
or affiliates under common control – should approximate the prices that unrelated parties would 
reach in similar circumstances. The arm’s length principle stems from the legal fiction that treats 
related parties as separate and independent (independent entity principle, above). The OECD 
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Tax rules and practices (or absence thereof) that can facilitate profit shifting
Transfer Pricing Guidelines (TPGs) endorse five methods of establishing arm’s length prices. These 
methods all require individualised fact-intensive analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case. 
They have come under increased criticism as excessively cumbersome and dysfunctional, and as an 
incentive for profit shifting.6  
c) Abuse of the notion of residence and the mobility of passive income 
Under the current system, business can quite freely chose the most convenient jurisdiction where to 
locate corporate residence and therefore where to tax passive income. Passive income is essentially 
income from dividends, interests, capital gains, and royalties. Under tax rules, passive income is taxed 
primarily at residence, where the capital was accumulated. Most often, a company is tax resident in 
the country in which it is registered/incorporated as a legal matter, or where the place of effective 
management/control is located. In all cases, the place of residence can be easily shifted from one 
country to another: if a ‘formal’ residence test applies (place of incorporation), residence is shifted by 
de-registering and registering elsewhere; if a ‘factual’ test applies (place of management/effective 
control), by taking board meetings and strategic decisions in specific locations. Thus residence is 
essentially under the taxpayer’s control, which results in passive income being very mobile (and, for 
this reason, typically subject to lower taxes than business income and wages). In deciding where to 
locate the group residence, MNEs shop around (‘residence shopping’) and choose the most 
convenient legislation in terms of taxes, accounting rules, directors’ liability, etc. 
d) Fragmentation 
Finally, profit shifting is enabled by a highly fragmented and inconsistent tax regime. In tax matters, 
there is no equivalent of the World Trade Organization: there is no coordinated set of multilateral 
rues, nor a binding dispute settlement system for cross-border tax disputes. Instead, “current 
arrangements that define and divide the international corporate tax base have evolved over the last 
century or so with little explicit coordination”.7 This has resulted in a highly fragmented legal 
landscape, fraught with regulatory loopholes and mismatches, on which tax avoidance thrives.  
A host of regulatory gaps and loopholes 
Altogether, the structural features outlined above enable and promote profit shifting. They create 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and tax abuse. They are at the root of the many technical 
loopholes and mismatches that MNEs exploit to avoid taxes. The G20/OECD BEPS project has 
identified a host of key regulatory gaps and loopholes that create opportunities for tax arbitrate and 
abuse – including mismatches in tax classifications across countries, profit shifting into controlled 
foreign companies, excessive interest deductions, ring-fencing, lack of substantial requirements and 
lack of transparency, unilateral tax rulings, treaty shopping, artificial avoidance of permanent 
establishment status in tax treaties, and abusive transfer pricing. With the adoption of the BEPS 
package, OECD and G20 countries set out 15 actions to address aggressive tax avoidance and 
harmful tax practices. A study on aggressive tax planning structures and indicators commissioned by 
the European Commission has listed thirty-tree tax rules and practices (or lack thereof) that can 
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facilitate aggressive tax planning.8 They go beyond the regulatory loopholes and mismatches 
identified in the BEPS project and also include some generic characteristics of a tax system that may 
still facilitate aggressive tax avoidance. For example, tax deductions for interest payments to foreign 
affiliated companies, absence of withholding taxes on interest payments, lack of thin capitalization 
rules or lack of other interest limitation rules, altogether are capable of facilitating structures where 
the tax base of a host country is eroded by means of financing costs.  
Current reforms: opportunities and challenges 
Profit shifting points to dysfunctions of the law that need to be addressed.  
Responses so far have been relatively fragmented. At the multilateral level, the BEPS project has led 
to a patchwork of specific anti-avoidance measures – often qualified by carve-outs, thresholds and 
reservations. These measures close important loopholes but only marginally tackle the root of the 
problem – the structural enablers of tax avoidance. At the unilateral level, a few countries have 
adopted far-reaching tax reforms that pierce the corporate veil of separate legal entities and treat 
MNEs as unitary firms, departing from key tenets of the ancient tax regime. Yet, these remain 
unilateral and uncoordinated actions. 
The international community seems to have reached a new critical reform momentum under the 
OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, under the Programme of Work on digitalization.9 For 
the first time, the OECD-sponsored machinery is re-considering the basic tenets of the international 
tax regime. Under Pillar 1 of the Programme of Work, Members of the Inclusive Framework have 
agreed to consider proposals that “would lead to solutions that go beyond the arm’s length 
principle”.10  Under pillar 2, countries are considering far-reaching measures that would counter 
profit shifting to entities subject to no or very low taxation – stopping a harmful race to the bottom 
in tax competition. While the reform route is promising, there are risks ahead: that, through the 
negotiating process, potentially far-reaching measures are diluted by means of carve-outs, thresholds 
and reservations; and that a diluted reform package is traded-off in exchange for a moratorium on 
potentially far-reaching unilateral or sub-regional measures, or versus the acceptance of terms to 
which developing counties are hostile, such as mandatory arbitration.  The coming year will clarify in 
which direction reform is heading.  
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